s	$\sim$	$\frown$
1	FRANK M. PITRE (SBN 100077)	
2	fpitre@cpmlegal.com JOSEPH W. COTCHETT (SBN 36324)	R.
3	jcotchett@cpmlegal.com ALISON E. CORDOVA (SBN 284942)	S PORS
4	acordova@cpmlegal.com ABIGAIL D. BLODGETT (SBN 278813)	CLE NOV
5	ablodgett@cpmlegal.com COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP	BOSS OF THE 2017
6	San Francisco Airport Office Center	DELA COUD
7	840 Malcolm Road, Suite 200 Burlingame, CA 94010	Deputy Clerk
8	Telephone: (650) 697-6000 Facsimile: (650) 697-0	JS77
10	STEVEN M. CAMPORA (SBN 110909) scampora@dbbwlaw.com	
11	DREYER BABICH BUCCOLA WOOD CAMPO 20 Bicentennial Circle	DRA, LLP
12	Sacramento, CA 95826 Telephone: (916) 379-3500 Facsimile: (916) 379-3	599
13	Counsel for Plaintiffs	
14	[Additional co-counsel listed on the signature page]	
15	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE S	TATE OF CALIFORNIA
16	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY	OF SAN FRANCISCO
17		CGC-17-562457
18 19	FRANK JORDAN, an individual; and WENDY PASKIN-JORDAN, an individual;	Case No.
20	Plaintiffs,	COMPLAINT FOR:
20	V.	1. NEGLIGENCE 2. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
22	V. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY,	<ol> <li>ANY EXSECONDENINATION</li> <li>PUBLIC NUISANCE</li> <li>PRIVATE NUISANCE</li> </ol>
23	a California corporation; PG&E CORPORATION, a California	5. PREMISES LIABILITY 6. TRESPASS
24	corporation; and	7. VIOLATION OF PUBLIC
25	DOES 1 through 20, inclusive;	UTILITIES CODE § 2106 8. VIOLATION OF HEALTH & SAFETY CODE \$ 12007
26	Defendants.	SAFETY CODE § 13007
27		JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
28 LAW OFFICES		

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COMPLAINT 

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 1
 PLAINTIFFS bring this action for damages against Defendants PG&E

 2
 CORPORATION, PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, and DOES 1 through 20

 3
 (collectively, "DEFENDANTS") as follows:

4 II. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

5 1. This case arises from PG&E CORPORATION and/or PACIFIC GAS &
6 ELECTRIC COMPANY's (collectively, "PG&E") longstanding corporate culture of decision
7 making that places profits over public safety. PG&E's well-documented disregard for safety
8 regulations, and blindeye towards the use of effective maintenance and inspection practices for
9 their facilities and equipment in light of an aging infrastructure, lies at the root of the various
10 factors which caused and/or contributed to causing some of the most destructive and deadly
11 wildfires California has ever seen (collectively, "North Bay Fires"), including the Tubbs Fire.

2. On the night of Sunday, October 8, 2017, the North Bay Fires started when power
lines, transformers, conductors, poles, insulators, reclosers, and/or other electrical equipment
constructed, owned, operated, managed, and/or maintained by PG&E fell down, broke, failed,
sparked, exploded, and/or came into contact with vegetation, all because of PG&E's disregard of
mandated safety practices and foreseeable hazardous risks associated with infrastructure.



Santa Rosa Before and After the Tubbs Fire, one of the North Bay Fires<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/fires/article178223651.html. COMPLAINT

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
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Over the following days, the North Bay Fires spread rapidly and caused extensive
 damage throughout Northern California, including populated neighborhoods and sprawling
 vineyards. The North Bay Fires claimed the lives of at least 43 individuals, displaced a massive
 number of people, burned over 200,000 acres, and destroyed thousands of homes and structures.



17

Flames from the Tubbs Fire Engulfing Structures in Santa Rosa<sup>3</sup>

18 4. As set forth in more detail in the following pages, based on prior reports, audits, 19 and/or investigations, it is clear that the North Bay Fires were an inevitable byproduct of PG&E's 20 willful and conscious disregard of public safety. PG&E, although mandated to do so, failed to 21 identify, inspect, manage, and/or control vegetation growth near its power lines and/or other 22 electrical equipment. This created a foreseeable danger of trees and/or other vegetation coming 23 into contact with **PG&E's** power lines and/or other electrical equipment and causing electrical 24 problems. Further, PG&E failed to construct, manage, track, monitor, maintain, replace, repair, 25 and/or improve its power lines, poles, transformers, conductors, insulators, reclosers, and/or other

26 27

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<sup>3</sup> http://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/California-wildfires-Mike-Grabow-40-among-dead-12279761.php.

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electrical equipment, despite being aware that its infrastructure was unsafe, aging, and/or
 vulnerable to environmental conditions.



15 5. PG&E knew about the significant risk of wildfires from its ineffective vegetation
management programs, unsafe equipment, and/or aging infrastructure for decades before the North
Bay Fires began, and has been repeatedly fined and/or convicted of crimes for failing to mitigate
these risks:

a. In 1994, PG&E's failure to trim trees near its power lines caused the devastating "Trauner Fire" in Nevada County, California. In 1997, a jury found PG&E liable for 739 counts of criminal negligence for causing this fire. Subsequent to the trial, a report authored by the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") revealed that from 1987 through 1994, PG&E diverted \$495 million from its budgets for maintaining its systems, and instead, used this money to boost corporate profits.

b. In 2003, **PG&E's** apparent inability to learn from its past mistakes caused a fire at its Mission District Substation in San Francisco. In 2004, the CPUC investigated the fire

<sup>4</sup> http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/10/25/pge-missed-electricity-inspections-violated-safety-

rules-in-bay-area-including-north-bay-audits/.

COMPLAINT

1		and concluded that "it finds it quite troubling that PG&E did not implement its own
2		recommendations" after a previous fire at the same substation to prevent the 2003 fire. <sup>5</sup>
3	c.	In 2008, PG&E's inadequate repair job and infrastructure caused a deadly explosion
4		in Rancho Cordova, California. In 2010, the CPUC fined PG&E \$38 million since
5		PG&E caused and failed to prevent the explosion.
6	d.	In 2010, PG&E's aging infrastructure caused the deadly gas explosion in San Bruno,
7		California. As a result, the CPUC slapped PG&E with a \$1.6 billion fine, and PG&E
8		was later found guilty of six felony charges.
9	e.	In 2011, PG&E caused an explosion in Cupertino because it failed to replace a plastic
10		pipe that it knew was unsafe since at least 2002. PG&E ignored warnings about the
11		dangerous nature of the pipe, and instead chose to do nothing.
12	f.	In 2014, PG&E's inadequate recordkeeping and disregard for public safety caused an
13		explosion in Carmel. As a result, <b>PG&amp;E</b> was required to pay over \$36 million in fines.
14	g.	Since 2014, PG&E has been fined \$9.65 million by the CPUC for incidents solely
15		related to their electrical distribution systems. <sup>6</sup>
16	h.	In 2015, PG&E was once again responsible for causing a massive wildfire called the
17		"Butte Fire" due its inadequate and unlawful vegetation management practices and
18		disregard for public safety. After the fire, in 2017, the CPUC fined PG&E a total of
19		\$8.3 million for violating multiple safety laws.
20	All of thes	se devastating events, and many more, resulted from PG&E's long history of choosing
21	to divert f	unds from its public safety, vegetation management, and/or infrastructure maintenance
22	programs	to instead line its own corporate pockets.
23	П. <u>Л</u>	IRISDICTION AND VENUE
24	6.	This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Code of Civil
25	395(a) be	cause, at all times relevant, Defendants and each of them have resided in, been
26	incorporat	ed in, or done significant business in the State of California so as to render the exercise
27		
28	<sup>6</sup> h	ttp://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/publishedDocs/published/Report/40886.PDF. ttp://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=1965.
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LAW OFFICES Cotchett, Pitre 8 McCarthy, LLP of jurisdiction over Defendants and each of them, by California Courts consistent with traditional
 notions of fair play and substantial justice. The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
 minimum of this Court.

7. Venue is proper in this County pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 395.5
because, at all times relevant, Defendants and each of them have their principal place of business
in the County of San Francisco.

- 7 III. <u>THE PARTIES</u>
- 8

# A. <u>PLAINTIFFS</u>

9 8. Plaintiffs FRANK JORDAN and WENDY PASKIN-JORDAN (collectively,
10 "PLAINTIFFS") are a husband and wife who lost a home at 2484 Mark West Springs Road in
11 Santa Rosa, California. All of the damages alleged herein occurred in and around Sonoma County
12 and arose from the Tubbs Fire, as set forth in more detail below.

13

# B. <u>DEFENDANTS</u>

14 9. At all times herein mentioned Defendants PG&E CORPORATION and 15 PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY (collectively, "PG&E") were corporations authorized to do business and doing business, in the State of California, with their principal place 16 17 of business in the County of San Francisco, California. Defendant PG&E CORPORATION is 18 an energy-based holding company headquartered in San Francisco. It is the parent company of 19 Defendant PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY. PG&E CORPORATION and 20 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY provide customers with public utility services, 21 and services relating to the generation of energy, transmission of electricity and natural gas, 22 generation of electricity, and the distribution of energy.

10. PLAINTIFFS allege that PG&E CORPORATION and PACIFIC GAS &
ELECTRIC COMPANY are jointly and severally liable for each other's wrongful acts and/or
omissions as hereafter alleged, in that:

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COMPLAINT

20 27 a. **PG&E CORPORATION** and **PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY** operate as a single business enterprise operating out of the same building located at 77 Beale St, San Francisco, California for the purpose of effectuating and carrying out **PG&E** 

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	CORPORATION's business and operations and/or for the benefit of PG&E
	CORPORATION;
b.	PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION do not
	operate as completely separate entities, but rather, integrate their resources to achieve
	a common business purpose;
c.	PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY is so organized and controlled, and its
	decisions, affairs and business so conducted as to make it a mere instrumentality, agent,
	conduit and/or adjunct of PG&E CORPORATION;
d.	PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY's income contribution results from its
	function, integration, centralization of management and economies of scale with
	PG&E CORPORATION;
e.	PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY's and PG&E CORPORATION's
	officers and management are intertwined and do not act completely independent of one
	another;
f.	PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY's and PG&E CORPORATION's
	officers and managers act in the interest of PG&E CORPORATION as a single
	enterprise;
g.	PG&E CORPORATION has control and authority to choose and appoint PACIFIC
	GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY's board members as well as its other top officers
	and managers;
h.	Despite both being Electric Companies and Public Utilities, PACIFIC GAS &
	ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION do not compete with one
	another, but have been structured, organized, and businesses effectuated so as to create
	a synergistic, integrated single enterprise where various components operate in concert
	one with another;
i.	PG&E CORPORATION maintains unified administrative control over PACIFIC
	GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY;

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1	j. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION are
2	insured by the same carriers and provide uniform or similar pension, health, life and
3	disability insurance plans for employees;
4	k. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION have
5	unified 401(k) Plans, pensions and investment plans, bonus programs, vacation policies
6	and paid time off from work schedules and policies;
7	1. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION invest
8	these funds from their programs and plans by a consolidated and/or coordinated
9	Benefits Committee controlled by PG&E CORPORATION and administered by
10	common trustees and administrators;
11	m. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION have
12	unified personnel policies and practices and/or a consolidated personnel organization
13	or structure;
14	n. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION have
15	unified accounting policies and practices dictated by PG&E CORPORATION and/or
16	common or integrated accounting organizations or personnel;
17	o. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and PG&E CORPORATION are
18	represented by common legal counsel;
19	p. PG&E CORPORATION's officers, directors, and other management make policies
20	and decisions to be effectuated by PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY and/or
21	otherwise play roles in providing directions and making decisions for PACIFIC GAS
22	& ELECTRIC COMPANY;
23	q. PG&E CORPORATION's officers, directors, and other management direct certain
24	financial decisions for PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY including the
25	amount and nature of capital outlays;
26	r. PG&E CORPORATION's written guidelines, policies, and procedures control
27	PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, its employees, policies, and practices;
28	
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s. PG&E CORPORATION files consolidated earnings statements factoring all revenue and losses from PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY as well as consolidated tax returns, including those seeking tax relief; and/or, without limitation; and

t. PG&E CORPORATION generally directs and controls PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY's relationship with, requests to, and responses to inquiries from, the Public Utilities Commission and uses such direction and control for the benefit of PG&E CORPORATION.

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## C. <u>DOE DEFENDANTS</u>

9 11. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or
otherwise of the Defendants DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, are unknown to PLAINTIFFS who
therefore sue said Defendants by such fictitious names pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
474. PLAINTIFFS further allege that each of said fictitious Defendants is in some manner
responsible for the acts and occurrences hereinafter set forth. PLAINTIFFS will amend this
Complaint to show their true names and capacities when the same are ascertained, as well as the
manner in which each fictitious Defendant is responsible.

16

### D. AGENCY & CONCERT OF ACTION

17 12. At all times herein mentioned herein, DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, hereinabove, were the agents, servants, employees, partners, aiders and abettors, co-conspirators, 18 and/or joint venturers of each of the other DEFENDANTS named herein and were at all times 19 20 operating and acting within the purpose and scope of said agency, service, employment, 21 partnership, enterprise, conspiracy, and/or joint venture, and each **DEFENDANT** has ratified and 22 approved the acts of each of the remaining **DEFENDANTS**. Each of the **DEFENDANTS** aided 23 and abetted, encouraged, and rendered substantial assistance to the other DEFENDANTS in 24 breaching their obligations to **PLAINTIFFS** as alleged herein. In taking action to aid and abet 25 and substantially assist the commission of these wrongful acts and other wrongdoings complained 26 of, as alleged herein, each of the **DEFENDANTS** acted with an awareness of his/her/its primary 27 wrongdoing and realized that his/her/its conduct would substantially assist the accomplishment of 28 the wrongful conduct, wrongful goals, and wrongdoing.

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IV.

### **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

A. **THE NORTH BAY FIRES** 

3 13. As families were settling in for the night on Sunday, October 8, 2017, tragedy struck 4 communities across Northern California. That evening, several fires began raging in and around 5 multiple counties in the Northern Bay Area, including the Tubbs Fire in Sonoma and Napa 6 Counties. These fires quickly ripped through neighborhoods, destroying everything in their path, 7 including residences, structures, businesses, trees, and vegetation in Santa Rosa.

8 14. The North Bay Fires are some of the most destructive fires in California's history. 9 In just a week, the fires caused the deaths of at least 43 people, displaced about 100,000 people

10 who were forced to leave their 11 homes and search for safety, 12 burned over 200,000 acres, and 13 destroyed at least 8,000 homes 14 and buildings. In particular, 15 the Tubbs Fire destroyed 16 approximately five percent of 17 Santa Rosa's housing stock, burned over 36,000 acres 18 19 across two counties, and killed 20 at least 19 individuals.



21

15. On the evening of Sunday, October 8, 2017, emergency responders began receiving 22 dozens of calls regarding fires and other hazards in and around Northern California. At least ten 23 of the calls reported electrical problems, transformer explosions, transformer fires, arcing 24 transformers, down power lines, arcing power lines, and/or flames in trees. Further, several 25 calls reported problems with PG&E's electrical equipment in the vicinity of the Tubbs Fire, 26 including a call at approximately 9:24 p.m. reporting a PG&E transformer explosion, a call at

27 28

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COMPLAINT

approximately 9:58 p.m. reporting down power lines, a call at approximately 10:14 p.m. reporting
 flames in trees, and a call at approximately 10:34 p.m. reporting falling power line wires.<sup>7</sup>



Broken and Burned Electrical Equipment in Santa Rosa, California<sup>8</sup>

13 16. One witness in Santa Rosa observed a power line and/or transformer near his home
sparking for approximately two minutes at or around 9:50 p.m. The sparks fell onto trees that were
right next to PG&E's power lines and other electrical equipment. After the sparking stopped, the
witnesses' neighborhood lost power and PG&E's power lines and/or other electrical equipment
17 fell down. This sparking occurred just outside of the Tubbs Fire.



<sup>7</sup> http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/10/10/pge-power-lines-linked-to-wine-country-fires. <sup>8</sup> *Id*.

<sup>9</sup> http://abc7news.com/i-team-pg-e-workers-believe-hurricane-level-winds-caused-deadly-north-bay-wildfires-power-line-damage/2525497.

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1 17. PLAINTIFFS are informed that witnesses observed and described downed power 2 lines, exploding transformers, improper fuses, improper connections, improper clearances, aged 3 and defective poles, and unrepaired poles in the area of the Tubbs Fire. Further, PLAINTIFFS 4 are informed that reclosers in **PG&E's** system were set to avoid outages and not to avoid fires, 5 even though fire conditions were known to be extreme. PLAINTIFFS are also informed that 6 **PG&E** failed to have a reasonable system in place to make sure that its contractors were properly 7 performing tree and/or vegetation inspections and removal, pole clearance, and pole inspections. 8 **PLAINTIFFS** are informed and believe that **PG&E** failed to take any steps to look for what it 9 calls Facility Protect Trees (trees which pose a risk of falling into the line), even though it knew 10 such trees were likely to exist after its contractors had performed their work. PLAINTIFFS are 11 informed that PG&E failed to properly construct its power lines and thereafter failed to take 12 reasonable steps to make sure the poles and lines were sufficiently strong to support lines and other 13 equipment that were added by third parties. Finally, despite knowing that wildfires posed the 14 greatest risk to the public from its electrical operations, PG&E chose to not ensure that its 15 contractors were properly trained in tree inspections and removal, chose to not ensure that its 16 contractors hired people who met **PG&E's** minimum qualifications, and chose to not participate 17 in the training of its contractors. **PG&E** owes the public a non-delegable duty with regard to the 18 operation of its power lines, including as it relates to maintenance, inspection, repair, vegetation 19 management and all other obligations imposed by the Public Utilities Code and the CPUC, 20 specifically including, but not limited to, General Orders Numbers 95 and 165. Even when PG&E 21 chooses to hire contractors, its obligations remain non-delegable. PG&E's acts and omissions, as 22 described herein, were a cause Tubbs Fire and/or aggravated the spread and destruction of the 23 Tubbs Fire.

2418.PG&E responded to the North Bay Fires by acknowledging that there were25problems with its electrical equipment on the night of Sunday, October 8, 2017. However, PG&E

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blamed its failing electrical equipment on winds combined with "millions of trees weakened by 1 2 years of drought and recent renewed vegetation growth from winter storms."<sup>10</sup>

3 19. At all times relevant to this action **PG&E** had specific knowledge that the greatest 4 risk to the public from its operations was wildfire. PG&E specifically knew that wildfire could 5 result in death and injury to members of the public and could result in the destruction of structures 6 and property. Despite such knowledge, PG&E chose to accept vegetation management that would 7 result in 17 tree related outages for each 1,000 miles of line, despite knowing that such outages could result in wildfires that would kill people, injure people, burn homes, and destroy property. 8 9 **PG&E** chose to accept that nearly 0.02 percent of the trees along its lines or nearly 20 in 1,000 10 trees would come into contact with or could fall into its lines and cause a fire. **PG&E** consciously 11 chose to accept that risk without providing any warning to the public. PG&E has specifically 12 acknowledged and at all times relevant to this action knew that if it spent more money on its 13 vegetation management program it could reduce the risk of wildfire. PG&E cited its limited 14 resources as the reason it chose to put the public in danger, while at the same time it was making 15 approximately \$1,400,000,000 in profits each year. Therefore, **PG&E** made a conscious decision 16 to put profits over the safety of the public. PG&E's choice resulted numerous deaths, injuries, 17 and damage to structures and property, just as **PG&E** knew it could, when it made the choice.

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
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#### **B**. THE DEADLY AND DESTRUCTIVE TUBBS FIRE


19 20. CalFire reported that the origin of the Tubbs Fire was in or around Highway 128 20 and Bennett Lane, in Calistoga, California. CalFire also reported that the Tubbs Fire started at or 21 around 9:45 p.m. on Sunday, October 8, 2017.<sup>11</sup>


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PG&E's website reports electric outages in real time. According to the website:
 any person can "select an icon on the map to view outage details or request outage updates. The
 map is updated every 15 minutes with any new information."<sup>12</sup>

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4	EMERGEN	ICIES - SAFET
5	POLE RESIDENTIAL BUSINESS	
6	YOUR ACCOUNT CUSTOMER SERVICE OUTAGES RATE PLANS SAVE ENER	RGY & MONEY SOLAR &
7	Report & View Electric Outages	
8	WILDFIRE UPDATES: Due to the wildfires, automated outage updates may be tur FIRE, we can generally get power restored in 48-72 hours. Get wildfire response	
9	This page is only for electric outages. For gas outages, please go to pge.com/ga	
10	Is this page helpful?	
11	SIGN UP FOR ALERTS	
12	You can sign up to receive outage updates via email, text or phone after reporting or selecting a REPORT OR VIEW BY ADDRESS	known outage.
13	Start entering the outage address, then select from the dropdown that appears.	
13	Enter address	
	VIEW BY CITY	
15	Scroll through the list to select your city.	
16	VIEW CITY LIST	
17	SEARCH THE MAP	
18	Select an icon on the map to view outage details or request outage updates. The ma Wildfire information on the outage map comes from the Google Statewide Fire Map.	
19	CUSTOMERS AFFECTED	
20	National Fight	7mg
21	See Reno	NEVADA
22		de
23		
24	San F Calsco	12 10
25		Death Valley National Park Las Veo
26		reasing and casive
27		
28	<sup>12</sup> https://m.pge.com/?WT.pgeac=Home_Outages#outages.	
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# C. <u>PG&E WAS AWARE OF FORESEEABLE WEATHER CONDITIONS</u> <u>AND EFFECTS OF THOSE CONDITIONS ON AGING</u> <u>INFRASTRUCTURE</u>

Northern California did not experience uncommon weather patterns the night the
 North Bay Fires began. A review of readings at weather stations in the areas impacted by the Fires
 shows that winds were at standard levels when PG&E's electrical equipment began to fail. For
 example, a weather station in Santa Rosa in the vicinity of the Tubbs Fire recorded wind gusts of
 about 30 miles per hour at or around 9:29 p.m. on October 8, 2017. About an hour later, the same
 station recorded wind gusts of 41 miles per hour. These wind speeds were surpassed in other
 recent storms in the area on a number of occasions.

26. According to **PG&E's** 2014 Annual Electric Distribution Reliability Report, sent to the CPUC on February 27, 2015, weather conditions have accounted for many of the top ten **PG&E** electrical outages each year since at least 2004, putting the utility on notice that these weather conditions occur and that they can cause electrical problems. For example, four of the "ten largest 2004 outage events" for **PG&E** occurred in the Santa Rosa and Sonoma areas, and winds were documented at much higher levels than those of October 8, 2017:

No. 3: "A strong weather front with gusty winds and heavy rain crossed the service area. Peak wind gusts in the norther and central portions of the

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
1 2	service areas generally ranged in the 35 to 65 mph range (58 mph at Arcata, 53 mph at Santa Rosa)"
3 4	No. 4: "A strong weather front with gusty winds and heavy rain affected the northern half of the service area. Winds gusted from 35 to 65 mph in the Bay Area, Redwood and Northern Interior zones on February 17 <sup>th</sup> ( <u>45</u> mph at Santa Rosa)"
5 6 7	No. 6: "A strong weather front with gusty winds and heavy rain affected the norther half of the service areaWinds gusted from 35 to 60 mph ( <u>60</u> mph at Santa Rosa)"
8 9	No. 7: "Gusty north winds developed over norther and central portions of the service area as a strong high pressure system developed. Peak wind speeds included 58 mph at Hopland, <u>51 mph in Santa Rosa, 47 mph at</u> <u>Sonoma</u> . Peak gusts in the East Bay hills ranged from 50-60 mph." <sup>14</sup>
10 11	27. In October of 2004, <b>PG&amp;E's</b> largest outage of the year affected 522,213 customers,
11	and involved "[T]wo storms (Oct 17 and 19) moved through the service area. Wind gusts were
13	generally between 24-50 mph (51 mph at Redding, 40 mph at Red Bluff, 37 mph at Napa) on Oct
14	17, and 35-60 mph on Oct 19 (51 mph Redding, 47 mph at Red Bluff, 51 mph at Marysville, 49
15	mph at San Francisco Airport, 55 mph at Bellota, 57 mph at San Luis Obispo)." <sup>15</sup>
16	28. Later, in October of 2009, <b>PG&amp;E's</b> largest outage of the year was "A strong early
17	season storm affected the entire service area with many stations reporting wind gusts over 50 mph
18	(57 mph at Ft. Funston (SF), 56 mph at Fairfield, 55 mph at Oroville, 51 mph at Monterey). Single
19	day rainfall totals ranged between two and five inches at many locations (4.54 in. at Watsonville,
20	4.27 in. at Fairfield, and 3.66 in. at Napa). National Weather Service records indicate this storm
21	was the strongest October rain and wind event since 1962." <sup>16</sup> Therefore, <b>PG&amp;E</b> had notice of the
22	type of winds that occurred on October 8, 2017, the night the North Bay Fires began.
23	29. Further, according to records maintained by CalFire, approximately 135 fires in
24	Sonoma and Napa Counties were caused by electrical equipment from 2011 through 2015. <sup>17</sup> In
25	
26	<sup>14</sup> https://www.pge.com/includes/docs/pdfs/myhome/outages/outage/reliability/
27	AnnualElectricDistributionReliabilityReport.pdf.
28	<sup>16</sup> <i>Id.</i> <sup>17</sup> http://www.fire.ca.gov/fire protection/fire protection fire info redbooks.
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2015, the last year of reported data, electrical power problems sparked the burning of 149,241
 acres across California – more than twice the amount from any other cause.<sup>18</sup>

30. In May 2016, the CPUC adopted Fire Map 1, which is a map that "depicts areas of
California where there is an elevated hazard for the ignition and rapid spread of power line fires
due to strong winds, abundant dry vegetation, and other environmental conditions."<sup>19</sup> It was
"developed by a team of independent experts selected and led by the California Department of
Forestry and Fire Protection."<sup>20</sup>

8 31. The CPUC adopted Fire Map 1 "in response to past devastating wildfires that were
9 reportedly ignited by power lines."<sup>21</sup> According to CPUC commissioner Mike Florio, "Fire Map
10 1 represents an important milestone in identifying areas that face a very high risk of a devastating
11 wildfire."<sup>22</sup> PG&E was put on direct notice of this map.

32. On Fire Map 1, the area in and around the origin of the Tubbs Fire is both red and
orange, indicating the highest level of elevated hazard for the "ignition and rapid spread of power
line fires due to strong winds, abundant dry vegetation, and/or other environmental conditions."



1 2

# D. <u>PG&E KNEW ITS INFRASTRUCTURE WAS AGING AND LESS</u> <u>RELIABLE TO PREVENT FIRES</u>

On May 6, 2013, a report was sent to the Safety and Enforcement Division of the 33. 3 CPUC from the Liberty Consulting Group who had been retained to conduct an independent 4 review of capital and operations and maintenance expenditures proposed by PG&E (hereinafter 5 the "2013 Liberty Report").<sup>23</sup> The **2013 Liberty Report** concluded that: "several aspects of the 6 PG&E distribution system present significant safety issues." It also found: (a) "addressing risks 7 associated with electrical distribution components has been overshadowed by electric transmission 8 and gas facilities;" (b) "addressing aging infrastructure and adding SCADA to the system comprise 9 the major focuses of safety initiatives for the distribution system;" and (c) "current 10 employee/contractor serious injury and fatality levels require significantly greater mitigation." 11

# i. <u>PG&E's Wires Were Found Highly Susceptible to Failure Due</u> to Age

34. One of the first key findings of the 2013 Liberty Report was that **PG&E** had a 14 "large amount of small size obsolete conductor remaining on PG&E's system." PG&E has 15 113,000 miles of conductors (a.k.a. wires), and according to the report, over 60 percent of those 16 conductors are highly susceptible to failure. The conductors are very small, and generally more 17 susceptible to breaking than standard size conductors. As the conductor ages, it becomes even 18 more susceptible to breaking. Weather conditions, such as winds and lightning strikes, will also 19 wear a small conductor more than larger ones. For these reasons, "[t]his conductor was once 20 popular, but is now recognized as obsolete, due to its small size." 21

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# ii. <u>Many of PG&E's Wires Do Not Remotely De-Energize</u> <u>When Down and In a Hazardous State</u>

35. A second key finding of the 2013 Liberty Report was that upon review of
PG&E's documents, on a daily basis and in 36 percent of cases, PG&E cannot remotely deenergize a downed line and must send someone on-scene to manually turn off the feed. During

<sup>23</sup> http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M065/K394/65394210.PDF.

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1	that time, the downed line is a hazard, and according to the 2013 Liberty Report, this hazard has			
2	"contributed to a number of fatalities and injuries."			
3 4	iii. <u>The CPUC Announced that Aging Power Poles Are Causing</u> <u>Significant Safety Hazards That Must Be Addressed</u>			
5	36. According to the 2017 CPUC Order Instituting Investigation Into the Creation of a			
6	Shared Database or Statewide Census of Utility Poles and Conduit:			
7	Poorly maintained poles and attachments have caused substantial property			
8	damage and repeated loss of life in this State. For example, inadequate clearance between communication and power lines, perhaps in conjunction			
9	with a broken cable lashing wire, caused the Southern California Guejito Fire of 2007 which (together with the Witch Fire) burned 197,990 acres and caused two deaths. Three more deaths occurred in 2011 when an electrical			
10	conductor separated from a pole in high winds, causing a live wire to fall to			
11	the ground. At least five more people lost their lives in pole-related failures in 2012 and 2015.			
12	Unauthorized pole attachments are particularly problematic. A pole			
13	overloaded with unauthorized equipment collapsed during windy conditions and started the Malibu Canyon Fire of 2007, destroying and			
14	damaging luxury homes and burning over 4500 acres. Windstorms in 2011			
15 16	knocked down a large number of poles in Southern California, many of which were later found to be weakened by termites, dry rot, and fungal decay.			
17	Communication and other wires are not infrequently found hanging onto			
18	roads or yards. Poles with excessive and/or unauthorized attachments can put utility workers at risk. Facilities deployed in the field may differ from			
19	what appears on paper or in a utility's database. <sup>24</sup>			
20	37. In the June 29, 2017 CPUC press release for the Order, the CPUC President			
21	Michael Picker stated, "Plain old wooden poles, along with their cousins, the underground			
22	conduits, are work horses, carrying most of our power and telecommunications. They sometimes			
23	get crowded and fail, causing outages and fires because of all the equipment crammed onto them."			
24	Further, "[n]ot knowing where all the poles are and who owns them, how loaded they are, how			
25	safe they are, and whether they can handle any additional infrastructure, is problematic to both the			
26	utilities and to the CPUC. Creating a database of utility poles could help owners track attachments			
27				
28	<sup>24</sup> http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M190/K872/190872933.PDF.			
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LAW OFFICES Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP 1 on their poles and manage necessary maintenance and rearrangements, and can help the CPUC in 2 our oversight role."25

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#### iv. PG&E Was Not Tracking the Condition of Its Electrical Assets, Despite Its Aging Infrastructure

38. Another recommendation of the 2013 Liberty Report was "the establishment of a 5 formal asset management program in Electric Operations." According to the report, "aging 6 infrastructure is best addressed by having a strategic asset management program in place. These 7 types of programs, such as the PAS 55 program, force a detailed and thorough condition 8 assessment survey of the major assets. These types of formal programs also take failure modes 9 into consideration. Long term sustainable plans can then be prepared to address the asset 10 A sustainable asset management will mitigate system safety risks from aging conditions. 11 infrastructure, which constituted a major portion of the safety items in this GRC." 12

39. The 2013 Liberty Report was so concerned about the state of PG&E's aging 13 infrastructure that it advised: "[w]e also recommend that PG&E treat aging infrastructure as an 14 enterprise-level risk." 15

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E.

### PG&E KNEW ITS ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT WAS UNSAFE

40. **PG&E** has a long-standing practice of using reclosers throughout its system to 17 automatically restart power after interruptions, even though it knows these devices may cause 18 wildfires. Reclosers send pulses of electricity through power lines whenever an interruption occurs 19 on lines equipped with the devices. According to experts, if power lines are in contact with trees 20 or vegetation, these pulses of electricity can start fires. For this reason, other utilities have changed 21 their operations to protect the public. 22

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41. The dangers posed by reclosers are so significant that the other two major utilities in California, San Diego Gas & Electric Company and Southern California Edison, have 24 reprogramed their electrical systems during fire seasons to ensure that reclosers do not 25 automatically restart electrical currents after a service interruption. In contrast, PG&E began an 26

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<sup>25</sup> http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M191/K560/191560905.PDF. COMPLAINT

1 experimental pilot program in 2017 in limited parts of California to reprogram its reclosures. Since 2 **PG&E** did not reprogram all of its reclosures to keep electricity turned off after a disruption during 3 fire season, the night the North Bay Fires began, some of PG&E's devices were programmed to 4 try up to three times to restore power by sparking electricity.

PG&E knew that its reclosures posed a great risk of wildfire. At a Congressional 5 42. hearing in 2015, PG&E's Senior Vice President of Electrical Operations, Patrick Hogan, stated 6 7 that **PG&E** had the ability to reprogram its reclosures during fire season to not restart power. 8 Patrick Hogan claimed that shutting down power means "you take the reliability hit, but you gain the wildfire benefit."<sup>26</sup> **PLAINTIFFS** believe that despite this knowledge and ability, **PG&E** 9 10 never reprogramed all of its reclosures to prevent wildfires.

11 43. In addition, since prior to 1996, PG&E has known or should have known that its 12 choice of chemical treatments for its poles can also make its equipment unsafe. For example, 13 **PG&E** uses and has used poles treated with pentachlorophenol in liquefied petroleum gas by the 14 Cellon® process. Those poles tend to experience surface decay below ground regardless of the 15 type of wood used for the poles. As a result, digging inspections are required for poles treated by 16 these processes for all wood types. However, PLAINTIFFS believe that PG&E has failed to 17 conduct the proper inspections and further, when PG&E has been advised of necessary repairs to 18 such poles, PG&E failed to repair the poles in a timely manner. These failures are a breach of 19 **PG&E** obligations to the public and have been a cause of fires.

20 21

#### F. **DESPITE THIS KNOWLEDGE, PG&E DID NOT MAINTAIN, REPAIR, OR REPLACE ITS EQUIPMENT**

44. On top of having wide-scale aging infrastructure and no formal, organized system 22 to track the condition of the infrastructure, **PG&E** failed to perform the necessary maintenance 23 and inspections of its electrical equipment. A 2015 audit of PG&E's Sonoma Division revealed 24 25 26 27 <sup>26</sup> http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Power-line-restart-device-implicated-in-past-28 12324764.php. COMPLAINT 24

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1	that there were over 3,500 unfilled PG&E repair and maintenance requests in the area of the Tubbs	
2	Fire. <sup>27</sup> This number is staggering in terms of safety to the people caught up in the fire zones.	
3	45. In a December 31, 2015 letter to PG&E regarding the audit, Fayi Daye, a	
4	supervising electric safety regulator with the CPUC, outlined the violations found in the review of	
5	records between 2010 and 2015 and a spot check of PG&E electrical distribution equipment. Fayi	
6	Daye's letter stated the following:	
7	PG&E's records indicated that from August 2010 to September 21,	
8	2015, a total of <u>3,527 work orders were completed past their scheduled</u> <u>date</u> of corrective action per PG&E's Electric Notification	
9	<b>Prioritization Standards.</b> Late work orders included overhead and underground facilities. <sup>28</sup>	
10	The letter concluded that these delays violated CPUC General Order No. 128, Rule 17.1, which	
11	sets forth the CPUC's design, construction, and maintenance rules for electrical systems.	
12	46. The audit also reviewed <b>PG&amp;E's</b> maps for its electrical distribution lines and found	
13	that over 50 pieces of overhead equipment – including pole mounted transformers and power lines	
14	- has not been inspected every year as required by law. This was a violation of CPUC General	
15	Order No. 165, Section III-B, which sets forth standards for inspections. <sup>29</sup>	
16	47. According to State Senator Jerry Hill, these findings are especially troubling	
17	because "they are getting the money for these, they are getting the funds to do the work in a timely	
18	manner." <sup>30</sup> Yet, PG&E takes the money but fails to correct the problems.	
19	G. PG&E'S "RUN TO FAILURE" APPROACH TO MAINTENANCE	
20	48. <b>PG&amp;E</b> has a well-documented history of implementing a "run to failure" approach	
21	with its aging infrastructure, whereby it ignores necessary maintenance in order to line its own	
22	pockets with excessive profits. According to a filing by the CPUC in May 2013:	
23	However, as we saw in Section V.F.3 above, the Overland Audit explains	
24	how PG&E systematically underfunded GT&S integrity management and	
25	<sup>27</sup> http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/Safety/Electric_Safety	
26 27	and_Reliability/Reports_and_Audits/Electric_Facilities/EA2015-018.pdf.	
27	<ul> <li><sup>29</sup> Id.</li> <li><sup>30</sup> https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/State-Audit-Shows-PGE-Had-Repair-Job-Backlog-in-</li> </ul>	
28	Sonoma-Santa-Rosa-451996923.html.	
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1		maintenance operations for the years 2008 through 2010. PG&E engaged
2		<u>in a "run to failure" strategy whereby it deferred needed maintenance</u> projects and changed the assessment method for several pipelines from ILI
3		to the less informative ECDA approach - all to increase its profits even
4		<u>further beyond its already generous authorized rate of return</u> , which averaged 11.2% between 1996 and 2010.
5		Given PG&E's excessive profits over the period of the Overland Audit, there is no reason to believe that Overland's example regarding GT&S operations between 2008 and 2010 was unique. The IRP Report
7		supplements the Overland Audit findings with additional examples of
8		PG&E management's commitment to profits over safety. <u>Thus, it is</u> evident that while the example of GT&S underfunding between 2008
		and 2010 might be extreme, it was not an isolated incident; rather, it
9		<u>represents the culmination of PG&amp;E management's long standing</u> policy to squeeze every nickel it could from PG&E gas operations and
10		maintenance, regardless of the long term "run to failure" impacts. And
11		<b>PG&amp;E has offered no evidence to the contrary</b> . <sup>31</sup>
12	H.	PG&E'S LONG HISTORY OF SAFETY VIOLATIONS
13	49.	Over the past thirty-plus years, PG&E has been subject to numerous fines,
14	penalties, and/or convictions as a result of its failure to abide by safety rules and regulations,	
15	including the following fines, penalties, and/or convictions. Despite these recurring punishments,	
16	PG&E refuses to modify its behavior, and has continued to conduct its business with a conscious	
17	disregard for the safety of the public, including PLAINTIFFS.	
18	50.	As detailed below, the North Bay Fires are just one example of the many tragedies
19	that have resu	Ited from PG&E's enduring failure to protect the public from the dangers associated
20	with its operations. PG&E power lines, transformers, conductors, poles, insulators, and/or other	
21	electrical equipment have repeatedly started wildfires due to PG&E's ongoing failure to create,	
22	manage, implement, and/or maintain effective vegetation management programs for the areas near	
23	and around it	s electrical equipment. Further, PG&E's aging infrastructure has caused multiple
24	disasters throu	ighout California.
25		i. <u>The 1994 Trauner Fire</u>
26	51.	In 1994, PG&E's failure to maintain the vegetation surrounding its electrical
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28	<sup>31</sup> ftp:// 0039691.pdf.	ftp2.cpuc.ca.gov/PG&E20150130ResponseToA1312012Ruling/2013/03/SB_GT&S_
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equipment caused a devastating wildfire in Nevada County, California. This Fire, commonly
 known as the "Trauner Fire" or the "Rough and Ready Fire," burned approximately 500 acres in
 and around the town of Rough and Ready, destroyed 12 homes, and burned 22 structures, including
 a schoolhouse that was built in 1868.

5 52. Investigators determined that the Trauner Fire began when a 21,000-volt power line 6 brushed against a tree limb that **PG&E** was supposed to keep trimmed. Through random spot 7 inspections, the investigators found several hundred safety violations in the area near the Trauner 8 Fire. Approximately 200 of these violations involved contact between vegetation and one of 9 **PG&E's** power lines. As a result, on or around June 19, 1997, **PG&E** was convicted of 739 10 counts of criminal negligence and required to pay \$24 million in penalties.

Subsequent to the trial, a 1998 CPUC report revealed that PG&E diverted \$77.6
million from its tree-trimming budget to other uses from 1987 to 1994. During that same time,
PG&E under spent its authorized budgets for maintaining its systems by \$495 million and instead,
used this money to boost corporate profits. Despite this public outing, PG&E continued its
corporate culture of putting profits before safety.

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### ii. The 2003 Mission District Substation Fire

In December 2003, a fire broke out at PG&E's Mission District Substation in San
Francisco. Despite signs of trouble appearing at control centers, the fire burned for nearly two
hours before PG&E operators showed up at the Substation, finding it full of smoke, and finally
called the Fire Department. The source of the fire was not located until five hours after it began.
As a result, nearly one-third of San Francisco's residents and business owners lost power, with
some waiting over 24 hours for their power to be restored.

23 55. The CPUC report of the investigation, which was released in 2004, illustrated
24 PG&E's careless approach to safety and apparent inability to learn from its past mistakes. An
25 excerpt from the report describes the following:

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	<ul> <li>Soon after undertaking the investigation of the 2003 fire, CPSD [CPUC's Consumer Protection and Safety Division] discovered that another fire had occurred at Mission Substation in 1996. CPSD's investigation team conducted a thorough analysis of both fires and found strikingly similar contributing factors and root causes. CPSD's team further determined that PG&amp;E had not implemented the recommendations resulting from its own investigation of the 1996 fire <u>CPSD finds it quite troubling that</u> PG&amp;E did not implement its own recommendations from its own investigation of the 1996 fire.<sup>32</sup></li> <li>The findings related to the Mission Substation Fire should have been a wake-up call to PG&amp;E to revamp its operating procedures to prevent future disasters. Instead, PG&amp;E's focus remained on</li> </ul>
9	corporate profits, while safety was relegated to the backburner.
10	iii. <u>The 2008 Rancho Cordova Explosion</u>
11	56. In December 2008, a gas leak from a <b>PG&amp;E</b> pipe caused an explosion in Rancho
12	Cordova, California. This explosion left one person dead, injured several others, and caused over
13	\$260,000 in property damage.
14	57. A National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") investigation revealed that the
15	leak was caused by PG&E's incorrect repairs in 2006, at which time PG&E installed a piece of
16	pipe to patch up an earlier leak. The investigative report for the incident concluded that the walls
17	of the new pipe were too thin, allowing gas to leak from the pipe, and that <b>PG&amp;E</b> failed to timely
18	send properly trained personnel to check out the leak, even though PG&E had been told several
19	months earlier that its emergency plans fell below required standards. Specifically, the report
20	noted the following:
21	Contributing to the accident was the 2-hour 47-minute delay in the arrival at the job site of a Pacific Gas and Electric Company crew that was properly
22	trained and equipped to identify and classify outdoor leaks and to begin
23	<ul> <li>response activities to ensure the safety of the residents and public.<sup>33</sup></li> <li>58. In November 2010, the CPUC filed administrative charges against PG&amp;E in</li> </ul>
24	connection with the Rancho Cordova explosion, alleging that <b>PG&amp;E</b> was at fault for the blast and
25	connection with the Rancho Cordova explosion, aneging that <b>FGCE</b> was at fault for the blast and
26	
27	
28	<ul> <li><sup>32</sup> http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/publishedDocs/published/Report/40886.PDF.</li> <li><sup>33</sup> http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/Final_decision/146914-03.htm.</li> </ul>
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1 that **PG&E** should have discovered the improper repair job that caused the explosion, but failed 2 to timely do so. As a result, the CPUC required **PG&E** to pay a \$38 million fine.

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#### iv. The 2010 San Bruno Explosion

4 59. On September 9, 2010, PG&E's continued disregard of public safety caused the 5 death of eight people, injured 58 people, and destroyed an entire neighborhood in San Bruno, 6 California when one of its gas pipelines exploded and burst into flames. Subsequent to the 7 explosion, the NTSB issued a report that blamed the disaster on PG&E's poor management of its 8 pipeline. In January 2011, federal investigators reported that the probable cause of the accident 9 was: (i) **PG&E's** inadequate quality assurance and quality control during its Line 132 pipeline 10 relocation project, which allowed the installation of a substandard and poorly-welded pipe section; 11 and (ii) **PG&E's** inadequate pipeline integrity management program, which failed to detect and 12 remove the defective pipe section.

13 60. As a result, **PG&E** was required to pay substantial fines for its massive safety 14 violations. In April 2015, the CPUC slapped **PG&E** with a \$1.6 billion fine for causing the 15 explosion and diverting maintenance funds into stockholder dividends and executive bonuses. 16 Further, in January 2017, a federal judge convicted PG&E of six felony charges and ordered it to 17 pay \$3 million in fines for causing the explosion.

18 61. Also, due to **PG&E's** corporate culture which repeatedly placed profits over safety, 19 the CPUC launched an investigation into the manner by which PG&E officers, directors, and/or 20 managing agents establish safety policies and practices to prevent catastrophic events. At the 21 beginning of the investigation, the CPUC President harped on PG&E's ongoing safety violations: 22

Despite major public attention, ongoing CPUC investigations (OIIs) and rulemakings (OIRs) into PG&E's actions and operations, including the investigations we voted on today, federal grand jury, and California Department of Justice investigation, continued safety lapses at PG&E continue to occur. <sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC Public Website/Content/About Us/ Organization/Commissioners/Michael J. Picker/PresidentPickerCommentsonPGESafetyCultureandEnfor cementTheory.pdf. COMPLAINT

1	v. <u>The 2011 Cupertino Explosion</u>
2	62. After the San Bruno explosion, in September 2011, <b>PG&amp;E</b> caused a gas explosion
3	that partially engulfed a condominium in Cupertino, California. The explosion was the result of
4	cracked Aldyl-A plastic pipe.
5	63. Prior to the explosion, the manufacture of Aldyl-A and the NTSB had both issued
6	warnings about this type of plastic pipe that was prone to premature brittleness, cracking, and
7	failure dating back to at least 2002. Despite these warnings and PG&E's knowledge of this risk,
8	PG&E did nothing to prevent the explosion. Although some utilities around the United States
9	have been replacing Aldyl-A pipes, <b>PG&amp;E</b> did not have a replacement program to phase them out
10	and adequately protect the public.
11	vi. <u>The 2014 Carmel Explosion</u>
12	64. In March 2014, a home in Carmel, California was destroyed due to a gas explosion
13	caused by PG&E. Prior to the explosion, PG&E was attempting to replace a gas distribution line,
14	but PG&E's records did not show that the steel pipe had a plastic insert. When crews dug into the
15	steel pipe to perform the replacement, the unknown plastic insert was pierced, allowing gas to leak
16	through the pipe and into the residence.
17	65. The CPUC once again required PG&E to pay a massive fine because of their
18	wrongdoing. In August 2016, the CPUC imposed a \$25.6 million fine on PG&E. With a \$10.85
19	million citation previously paid by PG&E in 2015 for the explosion, PG&E was require to pay a
20	total of over \$36 million in penalties for its shoddy recordkeeping and disregard of public safety.
21	vii. <u>The 2015 Butte Fire</u>
22	66. Tragedy struck yet again in September 2015, when PG&E's inadequate and
23	ineffective vegetation management programs resulted in the "Butte Fire" in the Sierra foothills.
24	The Butte Fire burned for 22 days across Amador and Calaveras Counties, killed two people,
25	destroyed 921 homes and/or structures, and charred over 70,000 acres.
26	67. Similar to the other disasters caused by <b>PG&amp;E's</b> wrongdoing, the Butte Fire could
27	have been prevented by <b>PG&amp;E</b> . The Butte Fire was ignited by a gray pine tree that grew and came
28	into contact with one of <b>PG&amp;E's</b> power lines. <b>PG&amp;E</b> knew that gray pines posed the highest risk
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LAW OFFICES Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP of catastrophic wildfires, but failed to identify and/or remove the dangerous tree pursuant to its
 vegetation management practices. Instead, PG&E removed the two trees surrounding the gray
 pine at issue, which exposed the gray pine to sunlight and allowed it to quickly come into contact
 with PG&E's power line.

5 68. **PG&E** made several decisions leading up to the Butte Fire that illustrate its 6 conscious disregard of public safety. First, PG&E's Risk & Compliance Management Committee 7 chose to not confirm their assumption that properly qualified and trained inspectors were being 8 used by its contractors to identify hazard trees. Similarly, **PG&E** chose not to verify that its quality 9 assurance audits were properly conducted. Moreover, **PG&E** Vegetation Management managers 10 directed its contractor to hire inspectors that they knew did not meet the minimum qualifications 11 required by PG&E's own specifications. Furthermore, PG&E managing agents chose to not train 12 inspectors on PG&E's hazardous tree rating system ("HTRS"), verify that its contractor trained 13 inspectors on the HTRS, or require inspectors to use PG&E's HTRS. Finally, PG&E conducts 14 annual quality assurance audits that identify a select number of hazardous trees from a small 15 sample, but chose to not look for additional dangerous trees despite knowing that its statistical 16 sample warned of the likelihood that thousands more hazardous trees existed in the larger 17 population.

69. Subsequent to the Butte Fire, in April 2017, the CPUC fined PG&E a total of \$8.3
million for "failing to maintain its 12kV overhead conductors safely and properly" and failing to
maintain a minimum distance between its power lines and vegetation. CalFire also sent PG&E a
bill for \$90 million to cover state firefighting costs. Despite these consequences, PG&E did not
change, revise, or improve any of its vegetation management practices after the Butte Fire, paving
the way for another massive wildfire.

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## I. <u>THE CORPORATE CULTURE AT PG&E THAT PUTS PROFITS</u> <u>BEFORE SAFETY</u>

Rather than spend the money it obtains from customers for infrastructure
 maintenance and safety, PG&E funnels this funding to boost its own corporate profits and
 compensation. This pattern and practice of favoring profits over having a solid and well-

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1 maintained infrastructure that would be safe and dependable for years to come left PG&E 2 vulnerable to an increased risk of a catastrophic event such as the North Bay Fires.

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71. For example, According to documents released by The Utility Reform Network 4 ("TURN"), PG&E supposedly planned to replace a segment of the San Bruno pipeline in 2007 5 that it identified as one of the riskiest pipelines in PG&E's system. PG&E collected \$5 million 6 from its customers to complete the project by 2009, but instead deferred the project until it was 7 too late and repurposed the money to other priorities. That same year, PG&E spent nearly \$5 8 million on bonuses for six of its top executives.

9 72. Moreover, **PG&E** has implemented multiple programs that provide monetary 10 incentives to its employees, agents, and/or contractors to *not* protect public safety. Prior to the 11 Butte Fire, **PG&E** chose to provide a monetary incentive to its contractors to cut fewer trees, even 12 though **PG&E** was required to have an inspection program in place that removed dangerous trees 13 and reduced the risk of wildfires. Robert Urban, a regional officer for a PG&E contractor, stated 14 that he had a concern that the bonus system incentivized his employees to not do their job, but 15 **PG&E** chose to keep this program despite knowing this risk. Similarly, prior to the San Bruno 16 explosion, PG&E had a program that provided financial incentives to employees to not report or 17 fix gas leaks and keep repair costs down. This program resulted in the failure to detect a significant 18 number of gas leaks, many of which were considered serious leaks. According to Richard 19 Kuprewicz, an independent pipeline safety expert, PG&E's incentive system was "training and 20 rewarding people to do the wrong thing," emblematic of "a seriously broken process," and 21 "explains many of the systemic problems in this operation that contributed to the [San Bruno] tragedy."35 22

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#### J. PG&E IS REQUIRED TO SAFELY DESIGN, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN ITS ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS AND THE SURROUNDING VEGETATION

73. At all times prior to October 8, 2017, PG&E had a duty to properly construct,

<sup>35</sup> http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/PG-E-incentive-system-blamed-for-leak-oversights-2424430.php. COMPLAINT

LAW OFFICES COTCHETT, PITRE & inspect, repair, maintain, manage and/or operate its power lines and/or other electrical equipment
 and to keep vegetation properly trimmed and maintained so as to prevent foreseeable contact with
 such electrical equipment. In the construction, inspection, repair, maintenance, management,
 ownership, and/or operation of its power lines and other electrical equipment, PG&E had an
 obligation to comply with a number of statutes, regulations, and standards, including the following.

74. Pursuant to Public Utilities Code § 451, "Every public utility shall furnish and
maintain such adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable service, instrumentalities, equipment, and
facilities . . . as are necessary to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience of its patrons,
employees, and the public."

- To meet this safety mandate, PG&E is required to comply with a number of design
  standards for its electrical equipment, as stated in CPUC General Order 95. In extreme fire areas,
  PG&E also must ensure that its power lines can withstand winds of up to 92 miles per hour.
- 76. 13 Further, PG&E must follow several standards to protect the public from the 14 consequences of vegetation and/or trees coming into contact with its power lines and other 15 electrical equipment. Pursuant to Public Resources Code § 4292, PG&E is required to "maintain 16 around and adjacent to any pole or tower which supports a switch, fuse, transformer, lightning 17 arrester, line junction, or dead end or corner pole, a firebreak which consists of a clearing of not 18 less than 10 feet in each direction from the outer circumference of such pole or tower." Also, 19 Public Resources Code § 4293 mandates PG&E to maintain clearances of four to 10 feet for all 20 of its power lines, depending of their voltage. In addition, "Dead trees, old decadent or rotten trees, 21 trees weakened by decay or disease and trees or portions thereof that are leaning toward the line 22 which may contact the line from the side or may fall on the line shall be felled, cut, or trimmed so 23 as to remove such hazard."
- Pursuant to CPUC General Order 165, PG&E is also required to inspect its
  distribution facilities to maintain a safe and reliable electric system. In particular, PG&E must
  conduct "detailed" inspections of all of its overhead transformers in urban areas at least every five
  years. PG&E is also required to conduct "intrusive" inspections of its wooden poles that have not
  already been inspected and are over 15 years old every 10 years.

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78. 1 **PG&E** knew or should have known that such standards and regulations were 2 minimum standards and that PG&E has a duty to identify vegetation which posed a foreseeable 3 hazard to power lines and/or other electrical equipment, and manage the growth of vegetation near 4 its power lines and equipment so as to prevent the foreseeable danger of contact between 5 vegetation and power lines starting a fire. Further, **PG&E** has a duty to manage, maintain, repair, 6 and/or replace its aging infrastructure to protect public safety. These objectives could and should 7 have been accomplished in a number of ways, including, by not limited to, putting electrical 8 equipment in wildfire-prone areas underground, increasing inspections, developing and 9 implementing protocols to shut down electrical operations in emergency situations, modernizing 10 infrastructure, and/or obtaining an independent audit of its risk management programs to ensure 11 effectiveness.

12 79. Finally, in June of 2014, the CPUC directed PG&E, by way of Resolution ESRB-13 4, to take remedial measures to reduce fires since the Governor had declared a drought in January. 14 In addition, the CPUC informed **PG&E** that it could seek recovery of incremental costs associated 15 with these remedial measures outside of the standard funding process, i.e. the CPUC was agreeing 16 to provide additional funding on top of vegetation management funding already authorized in order 17 to make sure remedial measures would not go unperformed due to lack of funding. "Although the 18 Governor issued an Executive Order in April 2017 ending the Drought State of Emergency, the 19 declaration directed state agencies 'to continue response activities that may be needed to manage 20 the lingering drought impacts to people and wildlife.' The California Tree Mortality State of 21 Emergency issued in October 2015 by Governor Brown regarding the bark beetle infestation and 22 resulting tree mortality remains in effect. The CPUC has not rescinded ESRB-4, and work by the 23 utilities to comply with it and the Tree Mortality Emergency continues."<sup>36</sup>

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## V. <u>DETAILS OF PLAINTIFFS' LOSSES</u>

25 26 80. Plaintiffs **FRANK JORDAN** and **WENDY PASKIN-JORDAN** are husband and wife. In 2002, they purchased a property at 2484 Mark West Springs Road in Santa Rosa that

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<sup>36</sup> http://cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC\_Public\_Website/Content/Safety/PGE%20Vegetation %20 Management%20Spending.pdf.

- 1 included a home and an attached guesthouse on 9.5 acres. The home was located on the west side
- 2 of the Mayacamus Mountains.




## Plaintiffs' Home Before the Tubbs Fire

81. On October 8, 2017, at approximately 10 p.m., PLAINTIFFS returned home from
dinner and encountered the smell of smoke. By 11:15 p.m., the smell of smoke was so intense
they went outside and observed a wall of flames roughly 75 feet high about one mile away.
PLAINTIFFS also had guests staying in their guesthouse that night. The fire was moving rapidly
towards PLAINTIFFS and their guests, so they furiously collected a handful of meaningful
photographs and fled in one vehicle with their guests down a long gravel road to Mark West
Springs Road to escape the fire. PLAINTIFFS then evacuated to San Francisco.

82. PLAINTIFFS' property and all of their personal items in and around their home,
guesthouse, and property were completely destroyed in the Tubbs Fire and are no longer
ascertainable due to the intensity of the fire. PLAINTIFFS suffered major losses in an amount
according to proof at trial.

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VI.

## CAUSES OF ACTION

## FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION NEGLIGENCE (Against All Defendants)

83. **PLAINTIFFS** incorporate and re-allege each of the paragraphs set forth above as though fully set forth herein.

6 84. The fire herein alleged was a direct and legal result of the negligence, carelessness, 7 recklessness, and/or unlawfulness of **DEFENDANTS**, and/or each of them. **DEFENDANTS**, 8 and/or each of them, breached their respective duties owed individually and/or collectively to 9 **PLAINTIFFS** by, including but not limited to: (1) failing to comply with the applicable statutory, 10 regulatory, and/or professional standards of care; (2) failing to timely and properly maintain, 11 manage, inspect, and/or monitor the subject power lines, electrical equipment, and/or adjacent 12 vegetation; (3) failing to properly cut, trim, prune, and/or otherwise keep vegetation at a sufficient 13 distance to avoid foreseeable contact with power lines; (4) failing to trim and/or prune vegetation 14 so as to avoid creation of a safety hazard within close proximity of the subject power line; (5) 15 failing to make the overhead lines safe under all the exigencies created by surrounding 16 circumstances and conditions; (6) failing to conduct adequate, reasonably prompt, proper, 17 effective, and/or frequent inspections of the electrical transmission lines, wires, and/or associated 18 equipment; (7) failing to design, construct, monitor, and/or maintain high voltage electrical 19 transmission, and/or distribution power lines in a manner that avoids the potential to ignite a fire 20 during long, dry seasons by allowing vegetation to grow in an unsafe manner; (8) failing to install 21 the equipment necessary and/or to inspect and repair the equipment installed, to prevent electrical 22 transmission and distribution lines from improperly sagging, operating, and/or making contact 23 with other metal wires placed on its poles and igniting fires; (9) failing to keep equipment in a safe 24 condition and/or manage equipment to prevent fire at all times; (10) failing to de-energize power 25 lines during fire prone conditions; (11) failing to de-energize power lines after the fire's ignition; 26 and/or (12) failing to properly train and to supervise employees and agents responsible for 27 maintenance and inspection of the distribution lines and/or vegetation areas nearby these lines. 28

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85. 1 As a direct and legal result of **DEFENDANTS**' actions and/or omissions, and/or 2 each of them, PLAINTIFFS have suffered damage to real property, including the loss of 3 vegetation, trees, and structures, the creation of hydrophobic soil conditions, and a loss of use, 4 benefit, goodwill, diminution in value, and/or enjoyment of such property in an amount according 5 to proof at trial.

86. As a further direct and legal result of **DEFENDANTS'** actions and/or omissions, 6 7 and/or each of them, **PLAINTIFFS** have suffered damage to and/or a loss of personal property, 8 including but not limited to items of peculiar value to PLAINTIFFS in an amount according to 9 proof at trial.

87. 10 As a further direct and legal result of **DEFENDANTS**' actions and/or omissions, 11 and/or each of them, PLAINTIFFS have incurred and will continue to incur expenses and other 12 economic damages related to the damage to their property, including costs relating to storage, 13 clean-up, disposal, repair, depreciation, and/or replacement of their property, and/or other related 14 consequential damages in an amount according to proof at trial.

15 88. As a further direct and legal result of **DEFENDANTS**' actions and/or omissions, 16 and/or each of them, PLAINTIFFS have suffered great mental pain and suffering, including 17 worry, emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, anguish, anxiety, and/or nervousness. 18 PLAINTIFFS are informed and believe and upon such information and belief allege, that such 19 injuries have resulted in debilitating injury in an amount according to proof at trial.

20 89. As a further direct and legal result of **DEFENDANTS**' actions and/or omissions, 21 and/or each of them, PLAINTIFFS have suffered a loss of income, loss of earning capacity, loss 22 of profits, increased expenses due to displacement, and/or other consequential economic losses in 23 an amount according to proof at trial.

24 90. Based on the foregoing, DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, acted willfully, 25 wantonly, with oppression, fraud, malice, and/or with a knowing, conscious disregard for the rights 26 and/or safety of others, such the PLAINTIFFS request that the trier of fact, in the exercise of 27 sound discretion, award **PLAINTIFFS** additional damages for the sake of example and sufficient 28 to punish the **DEFENDANTS**, and/or each of them, for their despicable conduct, in an amount COMPLAINT

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1	reasonably related to <b>PLAINTIFFS'</b> actual damages and <b>DEFENDANTS'</b> financial condition,		
2	yet sufficiently large enough to be an example to others and to deter <b>DEFENDANTS</b> and others		
3	from engaging in similar conduct in the future.		
4 5	SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION INVERSE CONDEMNATION (Against All Defendants)		
6	91. <b>PLAINTIFFS</b> incorporate and re-allege each of the paragraphs set forth above as		
7	though fully set forth herein.		
8	92. On or about October 8, 2017, <b>PLAINTIFFS</b> were owners of real property and/or		
9	personal property located within Sonoma County in the area of the Tubbs Fire.		
10	93. Prior to and on October 8, 2017, <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of them, installed,		
11	owned, operated, used, controlled, and/or maintained power lines and other electrical equipment		
12	for the public delivery of electricity, including power lines in and around the location of the Tubbs		
13	Fire.		
14	94. On October 8, 2017, as a direct, necessary, and legal result of <b>DEFENDANTS</b> '		
15	installation, ownership, operation, use, control, management, and/or maintenance for a public use		
16	the power lines and/or other electrical equipment, the power lines and/or other electrical equipment		
17	came in contact with vegetation and/or broke, failed, fell down, sparked, and/or exploded, causing		
18	a wildfire that burned thousands of acres, including property owned or occupied by <b>PLAINTIFFS</b> .		
19	The fire damaged and/or destroyed <b>PLAINTIFFS'</b> real and/or personal property.		
20	95. The above described damage to PLAINTIFFS' property was legally and		
21	substantially caused by the actions of <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of them, in their installation,		
22	ownership, operation, use, control, management, and/or maintenance of the power lines and other		
23	electrical equipment for a public use.		
24	96. <b>PLAINTIFFS</b> have not received adequate compensation for the damage to and/or		
25	destruction of their property, thus constituting a taking or damaging of <b>PLAINTIFFS'</b> property		
26	by <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of them, without just compensation.		
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1 As a direct and legal result of the actions and/or omissions of the **DEFENDANTS**, 97 2 **PLAINTIFFS** suffered damages to their real and/or personal property, including loss of use, 3 interference with access, and/or diminution in value and/or marketability in an amount according 4 to proof at trial. 5 As a direct and legal result of the actions and/or omissions of the **DEFENDANTS**, 98. 6 PLAINTIFFS have incurred and will continue to incur costs, disbursements, and/or expenses, 7 including reasonable attorney, appraisal, engineering, and/or other expert fees due to the conduct 8 of the **DEFENDANTS** in amounts that cannot yet be ascertained, but which are recoverable 9 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1036. 10 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION PUBLIC NUISANCE 11 (Against All Defendants) 12 **PLAINTIFFS** incorporate and re-allege by this reference each of the paragraphs 99. 13 set forth as though fully set forth herein. 14 100. PLAINTIFFS own and/or occupy property at or near the site of the fire which is 15 the subject of this action. At all relevant times herein, **PLAINTIFFS** had a right to occupy, enjoy, 16 and/or use their property without interference by **DEFENDANTS**, and/or each of them. 17 101. DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, owed a duty to the public, including 18 PLAINTIFFS herein, to conduct their business, in particular the maintenance and/or operation of 19 power lines, power poles, and/or electrical equipment on power poles, and adjacent vegetation in 20 proximity to their power lines in Napa and/or Sonoma Counties in a manner that did not threaten 21 harm or injury to the public welfare from operation of those power lines. 22 102. **DEFENDANTS**, and/or each of them, by acting and/or failing to act, as alleged 23 hereinabove, created a condition which was harmful to the health of the public, including these 24 PLAINTIFFS, and which interfered with the comfortable occupancy, use, and/or enjoyment of 25 PLAINTIFFS' property. PLAINTIFFS did not consent, expressly or impliedly, to the wrongful 26 conduct of **DEFENDANTS**, and/or each of them, in acting in the manner set forth above. 27 28 COMPLAINT 40

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1 103. The hazardous condition which was created by and/or permitted to exist by 2 **DEFENDANTS**, and/or each of them, affected a substantial number of people within the general 3 public, including **PLAINTIFFS** herein, and constituted a public nuisance under Civil Code §§ 4 3479 and 3480 and Public Resources Code § 4171. Further, the ensuing uncontrolled wildfire 5 constituted a public nuisance under Public Resources Code § 4170.

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The damaging effects of **DEFENDANTS'** maintenance of a fire hazard and the 104. 7 ensuing uncontrolled wildfire are ongoing and affect the public at large. As a result of the fire's 8 location, temperature, and/or duration, extensive areas of hydrophobic soils developed within the 9 fire's perimeter. This further caused significant post fire runoff hazards to occur, including hillside 10 erosion, debris flow hazards, sediment laden flow hazards, and hillside erosion. As a result, large 11 quantities of ash and sediment will be deposited in perennial and ephemeral watercourses.

12 105. As a direct and legal result of the conduct of **DEFENDANTS**, and/or each of them, 13 **PLAINTIFFS** suffered harm that is different from the type of harm suffered by the general public. 14 Specifically, PLAINTIFFS have lost the occupancy, possession, use, and/or enjoyment of their 15 land, real and/or personal property, including, but not limited to: a reasonable and rational fear that 16 the area is still dangerous; a diminution in the fair market value of their property; an impairment 17 of the salability of their property; soils that have become hydrophobic; exposure to an array of 18 toxic substances on their land; the presence of "special waste" on their property that requires 19 special management and disposal; and a lingering smell of smoke, and/or constant soot, ash, and/or 20 dust in the air.

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106. As a further direct and legal result of the conduct of **DEFENDANTS**, and/or each of them, PLAINTIFFS have suffered, and will continue to suffer, discomfort, anxiety, fear, worries, annoyance, and/or stress attendant to the interference with PLAINTIFFS' occupancy, possession, use and/or enjoyment of their property, as alleged above.

107. A reasonable, ordinary person would be reasonably annoyed or disturbed by the condition created by **DEFENDANTS**, and/or each of them, and the resulting fire.

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1 108. The conduct of DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, is unreasonable and the
 2 seriousness of the harm to the public, including PLAINTIFFS herein, outweighs the social utility
 3 of DEFENDANTS' conduct.

109. The individual and/or collective conduct of **DEFENDANTS** set forth above, and/or
each of them, resulting in the Tubbs Fire is not an isolated incident, but is ongoing and/or a
repeated course of conduct, and **DEFENDANTS**' prior conduct and/or failures have resulted in
other fires and damage to the public.

8 110. The unreasonable conduct of DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, is a direct and
9 legal cause of the harm, injury, and/or damage to the public, including PLAINTIFFS herein.

10 111. **DEFENDANTS**, and/or each of them, have individually and/or collectively, failed 11 and refused to conduct proper inspections and to properly trim, prune, and/or cut vegetation in 12 order to ensure the sole delivery of electricity to residents through the operation of power lines in 13 the affected area, and **DEFENDANTS**' individual and/or collective failure to do so exposed every 14 member of the public, including those residing in Napa and/or Sonoma Counties, to a foreseeable 15 danger of personal injury, death, and/or a loss of or destruction real and personal property.

16 112. The conduct of **DEFENDANTS**, and/or each of them, set forth above constitutes a 17 public nuisance within the meaning of Civil Code §§ 3479 and 3480, Public Resources Code §§ 18 4104 and 4170, and Code of Civil Procedure § 731. Under Civil Code § 3493, PLAINTIFFS 19 have standing to maintain an action for public nuisance because the nuisance is specially injurious 20 to **PLAINTIFFS** because, as more specifically described above, it is injurious and/or offensive to 21 the senses of the PLAINTIFFS, unreasonably interferes with the comfortable enjoyment of their 22 properties, and/or unlawfully obstructs the free use, in the customary manner, of PLAINTIFFS' 23 properties, and have suffered harm, injury, and damages.

113. For these reasons, PLAINTIFFS seek a permanent injunction ordering that
DEFENDANTS, and each of them, stop continued violation of Public Resource Code §§ 4292
and 4293 and Public Utilities Commission General Order 95, Rule 35. PLAINTIFFS also seek
an order directing DEFENDANTS to abate the existing and continuing nuisance described above.

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1 2	FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION PRIVATE NUISANCE (Against All Defendants)		
3	114. <b>PLAINTIFFS</b> incorporate and re-allege by this reference each of the paragraphs		
4	set forth as though fully set forth herein.		
5	115. <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of them, by their acts and/or omissions set forth		
6			
7	above, directly and legally caused an obstruction to the free use of <b>PLAINTIFFS'</b> property, an		
8	invasion the <b>PLAINTIFFS'</b> right to use their property, and/or an interference with the enjoyment		
9	of PLAINTIFFS' property, resulting in PLAINTIFFS suffering unreasonable harm and		
10	substantial actual damages constituting a nuisance pursuant to Civil Code §§ 3479 and 3481.		
11	116. As a direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of		
12	DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, PLAINTIFFS suffered, and continue to suffer, the injuries		
	and damages as set forth above.		
13	117. As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of		
14	<b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of them, <b>PLAINTIFFS</b> seek the recovery of punitive and exemplary		
15	damages against <b>DEFENDANTS</b> as set forth above.		
16	FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION		
17	PREMISES LIABILITY (Against All Defendants)		
18	118. <b>PLAINTIFFS</b> incorporate and re-allege by this reference, each of the paragraphs		
19	set forth as though fully set forth herein.		
20	119. <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of them, were the owners of an easement and/or real		
21	property in the area of origin of the Tubbs Fire and/or near Highway 128 and Bennett Lane,		
22	Calistoga, California, and/or were the owners of the power lines upon said easement and/or right		
23			
24	of way.		
25	120. <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of them, acted wantonly, unlawfully, carelessly,		
26	recklessly, and/or negligently in failing to properly inspect, manage, maintain, and/or control the		
27	vegetation near its power lines along the real property and easement, allowing an unsafe condition		
28	presenting a foreseeable risk of fire danger to exist on said property.		
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1	121. As a direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of		
2	DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, PLAINTIFFS suffered, and continue to suffer, the injuries		
3	and damages as set forth above.		
4	122. As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of		
5	DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, PLAINTIFFS seek the recovery of punitive and exemplary		
6	damages against <b>DEFENDANTS</b> as set forth above.		
7	SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION		
8	TRESPASS (Against All Defendants)		
9	123. <b>PLAINTIFFS</b> incorporate and re-allege by this reference each of the paragraphs		
10	set forth as though fully set forth herein.		
11	124. At all times relevant herein, <b>PLAINTIFFS</b> were the owners, tenants, and/or lawful		
12	occupants of property damaged by the Tubbs Fire.		
13	125. <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of them, in wrongfully acting and/or failing to act in		
14	the manner set forth above, caused the Tubbs Fire to ignite and/or spread out of control, causing		
15	harm, damage, and/or injury to PLAINTIFFS herein, resulting in a trespass upon PLAINTIFFS		
16	property interests.		
17	126. <b>PLAINTIFFS</b> did not grant permission for <b>DEFENDANTS</b> to wrongfully act in		
18	a manner so as to cause the Tubbs Fire, and thereby produce a wildland fire which spread and		
19 20	wrongfully entered upon their property, resulting in the harm, injury, and/or damage alleged above.		
20	127. As a direct and legal result of the wrongful conduct of <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or		
21	each of them, which led to the trespass, PLAINTIFFS have suffered and will continue to suffer		
22	damages as set forth above, in an amount according to proof at trial.		
23 24	128. As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful conduct of <b>DEFENDANTS</b> ,		
24 25	PLAINTIFFS, whose land was under cultivation, and/or was used for raising livestock or was		
23 26	intended to be used for raising livestock, have hired and retained counsel to recover compensation		
20 27	for loss and damage and are entitled to recover all attorney's fees, expert fees, consultant fees, and		
27	litigation costs and expenses, as allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.9.		
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1	129. As a further direct and legal result of the conduct of DEFENDANTS,
2	PLAINTIFFS seek double and/or treble damages for the negligent, willful, and wrongful injuries
3	to timber, trees, or underwood on their property, as allowed under Civil Code § 3346.
4	130. As a direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of
5	DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, PLAINTIFFS suffered, and continue to suffer, the injuries
6	and damages as set forth above.
7	131. As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of
8	DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, PLAINTIFFS seek the recovery of punitive and exemplary
9	damages against <b>DEFENDANTS</b> as set forth above.
10	SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
11	VIOLATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE § 2106 (Against All Defendants)
12	132. <b>PLAINTIFFS</b> incorporate and re-allege each of the paragraphs set forth above as
13	though fully set forth herein.
14	133. As a Public Utility, <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of them, are legally required to
15	comply with the rules and orders promulgated by the Public Utilities Commission pursuant to
16	Public Utilities Code § 702.
17	134. Public Utilities that fail to comply with duties required by the California
18	Constitution, a law of the State, a regulation, or order of the Public Utilities Commission, which
19	thereby leads to loss or injury, are liable for that loss or injury pursuant to Public Utilities Code §
20	2106.
21	135. As a Public Utility, <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of them, are required to provide
22	and maintain service, equipment and facilities in a manner adequate to maintain the safety, health,
23	and convenience of their customers and the public, pursuant to Public Utilities Code § 451.
24	136. <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of them, are required to design, engineer, construct,
25	operate, manage, and maintain electrical supply lines in a manner consistent with their use, taking
26	into consideration local conditions and other circumstances, so as to provide safe and adequate
27	electric service, pursuant to Public Utility Commission General Orders 95 and 165, and Rule 33.1.
28	
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1	137. <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of them, are required to maintain vegetation in		
2	compliance with Public Resources Code §§ 4293, 4294, and 4435, and Health & Safety Code §		
3	13001.		
4	138. By their conduct alleged above, <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of them, violated		
5	Public Utilities Code §§ 702 and 451 and/or Public Utilities Commission General Order 95,		
6	thereby imposing liability on DEFENDANTS for losses, damages, and/or injury sustained by		
7	PLAINTIFFS pursuant to Public Utilities Code § 2106.		
8	139. By further reason of the premises set forth above <b>DEFENDANTS</b> , and/or each of		
9	them, acted in a manner which violated the laws of this State and/or the orders or decisions of the		
10	Public Utilities Commission, as referenced herein.		
11	140. As a direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of		
12	DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, PLAINTIFFS suffered, and continue to suffer, the injuries		
13	and damages as set forth above.		
14	141. As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of		
15	DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, PLAINTIFFS seek the recovery of punitive and exemplary		
16	damages against <b>DEFENDANTS</b> as set forth above.		
17	EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION		
18	VIOLATION OF HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13007 (Against All Defendants)		
19	142. <b>PLAINTIFFS</b> incorporate and re-allege each of the paragraphs set forth above as		
20	though fully set forth herein.		
21	143. By engaging in the acts and/or omissions alleged in this Complaint,		
22	DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, willfully, negligently, carelessly, recklessly, and/or in		
23	violation of law, set fire to and/or allowed fire to be set to the property of another in violation of		
24	Health & Safety Code § 13007.		
25	144. As a direct and legal result of <b>DEFENDANTS</b> ' violation of Health & Safety Code		
26	§ 13007, <b>PLAINTIFFS</b> suffered recoverable damages to property under Health & Safety Code §		
27	13007.21.		
28			
ES re &	COMPLAINT 46		

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1	145. As a further direct and legal result of the DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them,		
2	violating Health & Safety Code § 13007, PLAINTIFFS are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees		
3	under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.9.		
4	146. As a direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of		
5	DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, PLAINTIFFS suffered, and continue to suffer, the injuries		
6	and damages as set forth above.		
7	147. As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of		
8	DEFENDANTS, and/or each of them, PLAINTIFFS seek the recovery of punitive and exemplar		
9	damages against <b>DEFENDANTS</b> as set forth above.		
10	WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS pray for relief as set forth below.		
11	VII. <u>PRAYER FOR RELIEF</u>		
12	WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS pray for judgment against Defendants PG&E		
13	CORPORATION, PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, and DOES 1 through 20, and		
14	each of them as follows:		
15	From All DEFENDANTS for Inverse Condemnation:		
16	1. Repair, depreciation, and/or replacement of damaged, destroyed, and/or lost		
17	personal and/or real property;		
18	2. Loss of the use, benefit, goodwill, and enjoyment of <b>PLAINTIFFS'</b> real and/or		
19	personal property;		
20	3. Loss of wages, earning capacity, and/or business profits or proceeds and/or any		
21	related displacement expenses;		
22	4. All costs of suit, including attorneys' fees where appropriate, appraisal fees,		
23	engineering fees, and related costs;		
24	5. Prejudgment interest according to proof;		
25	6. For such other and further relief as the Court shall deem proper, all according to		
26	proof.		
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1	Fro	m All DEFENDANTS for Negligence, Public Nuisance, Private Nuisance,	
2	Premises Liability, Trespass, Violation of Public Utilities Code § 2106, and Violation of		
3	Health & Safety Code § 13007:		
4	1. Repair, depreciation, and/or replacement of damaged, destroyed, and/or		
5	5 personal and/or real property;		
6	6 2. Loss of the use, benefit, goodwill, and enjoyment of <b>PLAINTIFFS'</b> real a		
7	7 personal property;		
8	3.	Loss of wages, earning capacity, and/or business profits or proceeds and/or any	
9		related displacement expenses;	
10	4.	Past and future medical expenses and incidental expenses according to proof;	
11	5.	Attorney's fees, expert fees, consultant fees, and litigation costs and expense as	
12		allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.9;	
13	6.	Treble damages for wrongful injuries to timber, trees, or underwood on their	
14		property as allowed under Civil Code § 3346;	
15	7.	Punitive damages as allowed by the law;	
16	8.	General damages for fear, worry, annoyance, disturbance, inconvenience, mental	
17		anguish, emotional distress, loss of quiet enjoyment of property, personal injury,	
18		and for such other and further relief as the Court shall deem proper, all according	
19		to proof;	
20	9.	For all costs of suit incurred;	
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LAW OFFICES Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP	COMPLA	INT 48	

1	10. Prejudgment interest according to proof; and
2	11. Any other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
3	Ξ.
4	COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP
5	Datad 11/12/17 Due Chie
6	Dated: 11/3/17 By: FRANK M. PHTRE
7	Attorneys for Plaintiffs
8	
9	STEVEN M. CAMPORA (SBN 110909) DREYER BABICH BUCCOLA WOOD
10	CAMPORA, LLP 20 Bicentennial Circle
11	Sacramento, CA 95826
12	Telephone: (916) 379-3500 Facsimile: (916) 379-3599
13	BRIAN J. PANISH (SBN 116060)
14	PANISH SHEA & BOYLE, LLP
15	11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700 Los Angeles, CA 90025
16	Tele: (310) 477-1700 Fax: (310) 477-1699
10	MICHAEL A. KELLY (SBN 71460)
17	WALKUP MELODIA KELLY & SCHOENBERGER 650 California Street
OUNADO.	San Francisco, CA 94108
19	Tele: (415) 981-7210 Fax: (415) 391-6965
20	MICHAEL D. GREEN (SBN 214142)
21	ABBEY, WEITZENBERG, WARREN & EMERY, PC
22	100 Stony Point Rd, Suite 200 Santa Rosa, CA 95401
23	Tele: (707) 542-5050 Fax: (707) 542-2589
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1	VIII.	JURY DEMAND	
2		PLAINTIFFS demand a	trial by jury as to all claims in this action.
3			
4			COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP
5		11/2/12	
6		Dated: 11/13/17	By:
7			
8			STEVEN M. CAMPORA (SBN 110909) DREYER BABICH BUCCOLA WOOD
9			CAMPORA, LLP 20 Bicentennial Circle
10			Sacramento, CA 95826 Telephone: (916) 379-3500 Facsimile: (916) 379-3599
11			Telephone. (910) 579-5500 Tacsmine. (910) 579-5599
12			BRIAN J. PANISH (SBN 116060)
13			PANISH SHEA & BOYLE, LLP 11111 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 700
14			Los Angeles, CA 90025 Tele: (310) 477-1700 Fax: (310) 477-1699
15			
16			MICHAEL A. KELLY (SBN 71460) WALKUP MELODIA KELLY & SCHOENBERGER
17			650 California Street
18			San Francisco, CA 94108 Tele: (415) 981-7210 Fax: (415) 391-6965
19			
20			MICHAEL D. GREEN (SBN 214142) ABBEY, WEITZENBERG, WARREN & EMERY, PC
21			100 Stony Point Rd, Suite 200
22			Santa Rosa, CA 95401 Tele: (707) 542-5050 Fax: (707) 542-2589
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